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ABSTRACT
In this paper we formulate the fixed budget resource allocation
game to understand the performance of a distributed market-
based resource allocation system. Multiple users decide how to
distribute their budget (bids) among multiple machines accord-
ing to their individual preferences to maximize their individual
utility. We look at both the efficiency and the fairness of the al-
location at the equilibrium, where fairness is evaluated through
the measures of utility uniformity and envy-freeness. We show
analytically and through simulations that despite being highly
decentralized, such a system converges quickly to an equilibrium
and unlike the social optimum that achieves high efficiency but
poor fairness, the proposed allocation scheme achieves a nice bal-
ance of high degrees of efficiency and fairness at the equilibrium.
1. INTRODUCTION
The primary advantage of distributed shared clusters like
the Grid [6] and PlanetLab [1] is their ability to pool to-
gether shared computational resources. This allows increased
throughput because of statistical multiplexing and the bursty
utilization pattern of typical users. Sharing nodes that are
dispersed in the network allows lower delay because appli-
cations can store data close to users. Finally, sharing allows
greater reliability because of redundancy in hosts and net-
work connections.
However, resource allocation in these systems remains an
issue. The problem is how to allocate a shared resource
both fairly and efficiently (where efficiency is the ratio of
the achieved social welfare to the optimal one). The main
challenge is strategic users who act in their own interests.
Several non-economic allocation algorithms have been pro-
posed, but these typically assume that task values (i.e., their
importance) are the same, or are inversely proportional to
the resources required, or are set by an omniscient admin-
istrator. However, in many cases, task values vary signifi-
cantly, are not correlated to resource requirements, and are
difficult and time-consuming for an administrator to set. In-
stead, we examine a market-based resource allocation sys-
tem (others are described in [5, 26, 20, 4, 27, 2]) that allows
users to express their preferences for resources through a
bidding mechanism.
In particular, we consider a price-anticipating scheme in
which a user bids for a resource and receives the ratio of
his bid to the sum of bids for that resource. This propor-
tional scheme is simpler, more scalable, and more respon-
sive [14] than auction-based schemes [5, 26, 20]. Previous
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work has analyzed price-anticipating schemes in the context
of allocating network capacity for flows for users with unlim-
ited budgets. In this work, we examine a price-anticipating
scheme in the context of allocation computational capac-
ity for users with private preferences and limited budgets,
resulting in a qualitatively different game (as discussed in
Section 6).
In this paper, we formulate the fixed budget resource allo-
cation game and study the existence and performance of
the Nash equilibria of this game. For evaluating the Nash
equilibria, we consider both their efficiency, measuring how
close the social welfare at equilibrium is to the social opti-
mum, and fairness, measuring how different the users’ util-
ities are. Although rarely considered in previous game the-
oretical study, we believe fairness is a critical metric for a
resource allocation schemes because the perception of un-
fairness will cause some users to reject a system with more
efficient, but less fair resource allocation in favor of one with
less efficient, more fair resource allocation. We use both util-
ity uniformity and envy-freeness to measure fairness. Util-
ity uniformity, which is common in Computer Science work,
measures the closeness of utilities of different users. Envy-
freeness, which is more from the Economic perspective, mea-
sures the happiness of users with their own resources com-
pared to the resources of others.
Our contributions are as follows:
•We analyze the existence and performance of Nash
equilibria. Using analysis, we show that that there is al-
ways a Nash equilibrium in the fixed budget game if the
utility functions satisfy a fairly weak and natural condition
of strong competitiveness. We also show the worst case per-
formance bounds: for m players the efficiency at equilibrium
is Ω(1/
√
m), the utility uniformity is ≥ 1/m, and the envy-
freeness ≥ 2√2−2 ≈ 0.83. Although these bounds are quite
low, the simulations described below indicate these bounds
are overly pessimistic.
• We describe algorithms that allow strategic users
to optimize their utility. As part of the fixed budget
game analysis, we show that strategic users with linear util-
ity functions can calculate their bids using a best response
algorithm that quickly results in an allocation with high ef-
ficiency with little computational and communication over-
head. We present variations of the best response algorithm
for both finite and infinite parallelism tasks. In addition, we
present a local greedy adjustment algorithm that converges
more slowly than best response, but allows for non-linear or
unformulatable utility functions.
• We show that the price-anticipating resource al-
location mechanism achieves a high degree of effi-
ciency and fairness. Using simulation, we find that al-
though the socially optimal allocation results in perfect effi-
ciency, it also results in very poor fairness. Likewise, allocat-
ing according to only users’ preference weights results in a
high fairness, but a mediocre efficiency. Intuition would sug-
gest that efficiency and fairness are exclusive. Surprisingly,
the Nash equilibrium, reached by each user iteratively apply-
ing the best response algorithm to adapt his bids, achieves
nearly the efficiency of the social optimum and nearly the
fairness of the weight-proportional allocation: the efficiency
is ≥ 0.90, the utility uniformity is ≥ 0.65, and the envy-
freeness is ≥ 0.97, independent of the number of users in
the system. In addition, the time to converge to the equilib-
rium is ≤ 5 iterations when all users use the best response
strategy. The local adjustment algorithm performs similarly
when there is sufficient competitiveness, but takes 25 to 90
iterations to stabilize.
As a result, we believe that shared distributed systems based
on the fixed budget game can be highly decentralized, yet
achieve a high degree of efficiency and fairness.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the
model in Section 2 and derive the performance at the Nash
equilibria for the infinite parallelism model in Section 3. In
Section 4, we describe algorithms for users to optimize their
own utility in the fixed budget game. In Section 5, we de-
scribe our simulator and simulation results. We describe
related work in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.
2. THE MODEL
In this section, we formally describe the model we work with
and define the terms and notations throughout the paper.
Price-Anticipating Resource Allocation. We study
the problem of allocating a set of divisible resources (or ma-
chines). Suppose that there are m users and n machines.
Each machine can be continuously divided for allocation
to multiple users. An allocation scheme ω = (r1, . . . , rm),
where ri = (ri1, · · · , rin) with rij representing the share of
machine j allocated to user i, satisfies that for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m
and 1 ≤ j ≤ n, rij ≥ 0 and ∑mi=1 rij ≤ 1. Let Ω denote the
set of all the allocation schemes.
We consider the price anticipating mechanism in which each
user places a bid to each machine, and the price of the ma-
chine is determined by the total bids placed. Formally, sup-
pose that user i submits a non-negative bid xij to machine
j. The price of machine j is then set to Yj =
∑n
i=1 xij , the
total bids placed on the machine j. Consequently, user i
receives a fraction of rij =
xij
Yj
of j. When Yj = 0, i.e. when
there is no bid on a machine, the machine is not allocated
to anyone. We call xi = (xi1, . . . , xin) the bidding vector of
user i.
The additional consideration we have is that each user i has
a budget constraint Xi. Therefore, user i’s total bids have
to sum up to his budget, i.e.
∑n
j=1 xij = Xi. The budget
constraints come from the fact that the users do not have
infinite budget.
Utility Functions. Each user i’s utility is represented by
a function Ui of the fraction (ri1, . . . , rin) the user receives
from each machine. Given the problem domain we consider,
we assume that each user has different and relatively inde-
pendent preferences for different machines. Therefore, the
basic utility function we consider is the linear utility func-
tion: Ui(ri1, · · · , rin) = wi1ri1+ · · ·+winrin, where wij ≥ 0
is user i’s private preference, also called his weight, on ma-
chine j. For example, suppose machine 1 has a faster CPU
but less memory than machine 2, and user 1 runs CPU
bounded applications, while user 2 runs memory bounded
applications. As a result, w11 > w12 and w21 < w22.
Our definition of utility functions corresponds to the user
having enough jobs or enough parallelism within jobs to uti-
lize all the machines. Consequently, the user’s goal is to grab
as much of a resource as possible. We call this the infinite
parallelism model. In practice, a user’s application may have
an inherent limit on parallelization (e.g., some computations
must be done sequentially) or there may be a system limit
(e.g., the applications data is being served from a file server
with limited capacity). To model this, we also consider the
more realistic finite parallelism model, where the user’s par-
allelism is bounded by ki, and the user’s utility Ui is defined
to be the sum of ki largest wijrij . In this model, the user
only submits bids to up to ki machines.
There are other system issues that this model does not con-
sider. There is usually a delay before a user can utilize a
machine. For example, the user must copy code and data
to a machine before running his application there. This
model assumes that the job size is large enough that this
delay is negligible. Another issue is that there is overhead
for multiplexing resources on a single machine. This model
assumes the degree of multiplexing is sufficiently low that
the overhead of modern operating system and virtualization
technologies is negligible.
Best Response. As typically, we assume the users are
selfish and strategic — they all act to maximize their own
utility, defined by their utility functions. From the perspec-
tive of user i, if the total bids of the other users placed on
each machine j is yj , then the best response of user i to the
system is the solution of the following optimization problem:
maximize Ui(
xij
xij+yj
) subject to
∑n
j=1 xij = Xi, and xij ≥ 0.
The difficulty of the above optimization problem depends
on the formulation of Ui. We will show later how to solve
it for the infinite parallelism model and provide a heuristic
for finite parallelism model.
Nash Equilibrium. By the assumption that the user is
selfish, each user’s bidding vector is the best response to the
system. The question we are most interested in is whether
there exists a collection of bidding vectors, one for each user,
such that each user’s bidding vector is the best response to
those of the other users. Such a state is known as the Nash
equilibrium, a central concept in Game Theory. Formally,
the bidding vectors x1, . . . ,xm is a Nash equilibrium if for
any 1 ≤ i ≤ m, xi is the best response to the system, or, for
any other bidding vector x′i,
Ui(x1, . . . ,xi, . . . ,xm) ≥ Ui(x1, . . . ,x′i, . . . ,xm) .
The Nash equilibrium is desirable because it is a stable state
at which no one has incentive to change his strategy. But
a game may not have an equilibrium. Indeed, Nash equilib-
rium may not exist in the price anticipating scheme we de-
fined above. This can be shown by a simple example of two
players and two machines. For example, let U1(r1, r2) = r1
and U2(r1, r2) = r1 + r2. Then player 1 should never bid
on machine 2 because it has no value to him. Now, player
2 has to put a positive bid on machine 2 in order to claim
the machine, but there is no low limit, resulting the non-
existence of the Nash equilibrium. Clearly, this happens
whenever there is a resource that is “wanted” by only one
player. To rule out this case, we consider those strongly com-
petitive games. Under the infinite parallelism model, a game
is called strongly competitive if for any 1 ≤ j ≤ n, there ex-
ist i 6= k such that wij , wkj > 0. Under such condition, we
have that
Theorem 1. There always exists a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium in a strongly competitive game.
Proof. The result is a special case of the general result
in [29]. We have included in Appendix A a simpler proof for
linear utility functions considered in this paper.
Given the existence of the Nash equilibrium, the next impor-
tant question is the performance at the Nash equilibrium,
which is often measured by its efficiency and fairness.
Efficiency (Price of Anarchy). For an allocation scheme
ω ∈ Ω, denote by U(ω) =∑i Ui(ri) the social welfare under
ω. Let U∗ = maxω∈Ω U(ω) denote the optimal social welfare
— the maximum possible aggregated user utilities. The effi-
ciency at an allocation scheme ω is defined as π(ω) = U(ω)
U∗
.
Let Ω0 denote the set of the allocation at the Nash equilib-
rium. When there exists Nash equilibrium, i.e. Ω0 6= ∅, de-
fine the efficiency of a game Q to be π(Q) = minω∈Ω0 π(ω).
It is usually the case that π < 1, i.e. there is an efficiency loss
at a Nash equilibrium. Such loss can be viewed as caused by
the lack of central enforcement of the user’s behavior. Thus,
such efficiency loss is also called the price of anarchy, a term
coined in [17]. The price of anarchy is an important metric
as it represents the maximum social loss as a result of the
users’ rationality and the decentralization of the allocation
scheme.
Fairness. While the definition of efficiency is standard,
there are multiple ways to define fairness. We consider two
metrics. One is by comparing the users’ utilities. The utility
uniformity τ (ω) of an allocation scheme ω is defined to be
mini Ui(ω)
maxi Ui(ω)
, the ratio of the minimum utility and the max-
imum utility among the users. Such definition (or utility
discrepancy defined similarly as maxi Ui(ω)
mini Ui(ω)
) is used exten-
sively in Computer Science literature. Under this defini-
tion, the utility uniformity τ (Q) of a game Q is defined to
be τ (Q) = minω∈Ω0 τ (ω).
The other metric extensively studied in Economics is the
concept of envy-freeness [25]. Unlike the utility uniformity
metric, the enviness concerns how the user perceives the
value of the share assigned to him, compared to the shares
other users receive. Within such a framework, define the
envy-freeness of an allocation scheme ω by ρ(ω) = mini,j
Ui(ri)
Ui(rj)
.
When ρ(ω) ≥ 1, the scheme is known as an envy-free allo-
cation scheme. Likewise, the envy-freeness ρ(Q) of a game
Q is defined to be ρ(Q) = minω∈Ω0 ρ(ω).
3. NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we present some theoretical results regard-
ing the performance at Nash equilibrium under the infinite
parallelism model. We assume that the game is strongly
competitive to guarantee the existence of equilibria. For a
meaningful discussion of efficiency and fairness, we assume
that the users are symmetric by requiring that Xi = 1 and∑n
j=1 wij = 1 for all the 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Or informally, we
require all the users have the same budget, and they have
the same utility when they own all the resources. This pre-
cludes the case when a user has an extremely high budget,
resulting in very low efficiency or low fairness at equilibrium.
We first provide a characterization of the equilibria. By def-
inition, the bidding vectors x1, . . . ,xm is a Nash equilibrium
if and only if each player’s strategy is the best response to the
group’s bids. Since Ui is a linear function and the domain of
each users bids {(xi1, . . . , xin)|∑j xij = Xi , and xij ≥ 0} is
a convex set, the optimality condition is that there exists
λi > 0 such that
∂Ui
∂xij
= wij
Yj − xij
Y 2j
{
= λi if xij > 0, and
< λi if xij = 0.
(1)
Or intuitively, at an equilibrium, each user has the same
marginal value on machines where they place positive bids
and has lower marginal values on those machines where they
do not bid.
Under the infinite parallelism model, it is easy to compute
the social optimum U∗ as it is achieved when we allocate
each machine wholly to the person who has the maximum
weight on the machine, i.e. U∗ =
∑n
j=1max1≤i≤m wij .
3.1 Two-player Games
We first show that even in the simplest nontrivial case when
there are two users and two machines, the game has interest-
ing properties. We start with two special cases to provide
some intuition about the game. The weight matrices are
shown in figure 1(a) and (b), which correspond respectively
to the equal-weight and opposite-weight games. Let x and
y denote the respective bids of users 1 and 2 on machine 1.
Denote by s = x+ y and δ = (2− s)/s.
Equal-weight game. In Figure 1, both users have equal
valuations for the two machines. By the optimality condi-
tion, for the bid vectors to be in equilibrium, they need to
satisfy the following equations according to (1)
α
y
(x+ y)2
= (1− α) 1− y
(2− x− y)2
α
x
(x+ y)2
= (1− α) 1− x
(2− x− y)2
Figure 1: Two special cases of two-player games.
By simplifying the above equations, we obtain that δ = 1−
1/α and x = y = α. Thus, there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium of the game where the two users have the same
bidding vector. At the equilibrium, the utility of each user
is 1/2, and the social welfare is 1. On the other hand, the
social optimum is clearly 1. Thus, the equal-weight game
is ideal as the efficiency, utility uniformity, and the envy-
freeness are all 1.
Opposite-weight game. The situation is different for the
opposite game in which the two users put the exact oppo-
site weights on the two machines. Assume that α ≥ 1/2.
Similarly, for the bid vectors to be at the equilibrium, they
need to satisfy
α
y
(x+ y)2
= (1− α) 1− y
(2− x− y)2
(1− α) x
(x+ y)2
= α
1− x
(2− x− y)2
By simplifying the above equations, we have that each Nash
equilibrium corresponds to a nonnegative root of the cubic
equation f(δ) = δ3−cδ2+cδ−1 = 0, where c = 1
2α(1−α) −1.
Clearly, δ = 1 is a root of f(δ). When δ = 1, we have
that x = α, y = 1− α, which is the symmetric equilibrium
that is consistent with our intuition — each user puts a
bid proportional to his preference of the machine. At this
equilibrium, U = 2 − 4α(1 − α), U∗ = 2α, and U/U∗ =
(2α + 1
α
) − 2, which is minimized when α =
√
2
2
with the
minimum value of 2
√
2 − 2 ≈ 0.828. However, when α is
large enough, there exist two other roots, corresponding to
less intuitive asymmetric equilibria.
Intuitively, the asymmetric equilibrium arises when user 1
values machine 1 a lot, but by placing even a relatively small
bid on machine 1, he can get most of the machine because
user 2 values machine 1 very little, and thus places an even
smaller bid. In this case, user 1 gets most of machine 1 and
almost half of machine 2.
The threshold is at when f ′(1) = 0, i.e. when c = 1
2α(1−α) =
4. This solves to α0 =
2+
√
2
4
≈ 0.854. Those asymmetric
equilibria at δ 6= 1 are “bad” as they yield lower efficiency
than the symmetric equilibrium. Let δ0 be the minimum
root. When α → 0, c → +∞, and δ0 = 1/c + o(1/c) → 0.
Then, x, y → 1. Thus, U → 3/2, U∗ → 2, and U/U∗ → 0.75.
From the above simple game, we already observe that the
Nash equilibrium may not be unique, which is different from
many congestion games in which the Nash equilibrium is
unique.
For the general two player game, we can show that 0.75
is actually the worst efficiency bound with a proof in Ap-
pendix B. Further, at the asymmetric equilibrium, the util-
ity uniformity approaches 1/2 when α → 1. This is the
worst possible for two player games because as we show in
Section 3.2, a user’s utility at any Nash equilibrium is at
least 1/m in the m-player game. Since the utility of one
player can be at most 1, and the utility of the other player
be at worst 1/2, the utility uniformity is at least 1/2.
Another consequence is that the two player game is always
envy-free. Suppose that the two user’s shares are r1 =
(r11, . . . , r1n) and r2 = (r21, . . . , r2n) respectively. Then
U1(r1) + U1(r2) = U1(r1 + r2) = U1(1, . . . , 1) = 1 because
ri1 + ri2 = 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Again by that U1(r1) ≥ 1/2,
we have that U1(r1) ≥ U1(r2), i.e. any equilibrium alloca-
tion is envy-free.
Theorem 2. For a two player game, π(Q) ≥ 3/4, τ (Q) ≥
0.5, and ρ(Q) = 1. All the bounds are tight in the worst case.
3.2 Multi-player Game
For large numbers of players, the loss in social welfare can be
unfortunately large. The following example shows the worst
case bound. Consider a system with m = n2+n players and
n machines. Of the players, there are n2 who have the same
weights on all the machines, i.e. 1/n on each machine. The
other n players have weight 1, each on a different machine
and 0 (or a sufficiently small ǫ) on all the other machines.
Clearly, U∗ = n. The following allocation is an equilibrium:
the first n2 players evenly distribute their money among all
the machines, the other n player invest all of their money on
their respective favorite machine. Hence, the total money on
each machine is n+1. At this equilibrium, each of the first n2
players receives 1
n
1/n
n+1
= 1
n2(n+1)
on each machine, resulting
in a total utility of n3 · 1
n2(n+1)
< 1. The other n players
each receives 1
n+1
on their favorite machine, resulting in a
total utility of n · 1
n+1
< 1. Therefore, the total utility of the
equilibrium is < 2, while the social optimum is n = Θ(
√
m).
This bound is the worst possible.
What about the utility uniformity of the multi-player allo-
cation game? We next show that the utility uniformity of
the m-player allocation game cannot exceed m.
Let (S1, . . . , Sn) be the current total bids on the n machines,
excluding user i. User i can ensure a utility of 1/m by
distributing his budget proportionally to the current bids.
That is, user i, by bidding sij = Xi/
∑n
i=1 Si on machine j,
obtains a resource level of:
rij =
sij
sij + Sj
=
Sj/
∑n
i=1 Si
Sj/
∑n
i=1 Si + Sj
=
1
1 +
∑n
i=1 Si
,
where
∑n
j=1 Sj =
∑m
j=1Xj −Xi = m− 1.
Therefore, rij =
1
1+m−1 =
1
m
. The total utility of user i is
n∑
j=1
rijwij = (1/m)
n∑
j=1
wij = 1/m .
Since each user’s utility cannot exceed 1, the minimal pos-
sible uniformity is 1/m.
While the utility uniformity can be small, the envy-freeness,
on the other hand, is bounded by a constant of 2
√
2 − 2 ≈
0.828, as shown in [29]. To summarize, we have that
Theorem 3. For the m-player game Q, π(Q) = Ω(1/
√
m),
τ (Q) ≥ 1/m, and ρ(Q) ≥ 2√2− 2. All of these bounds are
tight in the worst case.
4. ALGORITHMS
In the previous section, we present the performance bounds
of the game under the infinite parallelism model. However,
the more interesting questions in practice are how the equi-
librium can be reached and what is the performance at the
Nash equilibrium for the typical distribution of utility func-
tions. In particular, we would like to know if the intuitive
strategy of each player constantly re-adjusting his bids ac-
cording to the best response algorithm leads to the equilib-
rium. To answer these questions, we resort to simulations.
In this section, we present the algorithms that we use to
compute or approximate the best response and the social
optimum in our experiments. We consider both the infinite
parallelism and finite parallelism model.
4.1 Infinite Parallelism Model
As we mentioned before, it is easy to compute the social
optimum under the infinite parallelism model — we simply
assign each machine to the user who likes it the most. We
now present the algorithm for computing the best response.
Recall that for weights w1, . . . , wn, total bids y1, . . . , yn, and
the budget X, the best response is to solve the following
optimization problem
maximize U =
∑n
j=1 wj
xj
xj+yj
subject to
∑n
j=1 xj = X, and xj ≥ 0.
To compute the best response, we first sort
wj
yj
in decreasing
order. Without loss of generality, suppose that
w1
y1
≥ w2
y2
≥ . . . wn
yn
.
Suppose that x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) is the optimum solution.
We show that if x∗i = 0, then for any j > i, x
∗
j = 0 too.
Suppose this were not true. Then
∂U
∂xj
(x∗) = wj
yj
(x∗j + yj)2
< wj
yj
y2j
=
wj
yj
≤ wi
yi
=
∂U
∂xi
(x∗) .
Thus it contradicts with the optimality condition (1). Sup-
pose that k = max{i|x∗i > 0}. Again, by the optimality con-
dition, there exists λ such that wi
yi
(x∗
i
+yi)
2 = λ for 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
and x∗i = 0 for i > k. Equivalently, we have that:
x∗i =
√
wiyi
λ
− yi , for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and x∗i = 0 for i > k.
Replacing them in the equation
∑n
i=1 x
∗
i = X, we can solve
for λ =
(
∑k
i=1
√
wiyi)
2
(X+
∑
k
i=1
yi)
2
. Thus,
x∗i =
√
wiyi∑k
i=1
√
wiyi
(X +
k∑
i=1
yi)− yi .
The remaining question is how to determine k? It is the
largest value such that x∗k > 0. Thus, we obtain the fol-
lowing algorithm to compute the best response of a user:
1. Sort the machines according to wi
yi
in decreasing order.
2. Compute the largest k such that
√
wkyk∑k
i=1
√
wiyi
(X +
k∑
i=1
yi)− yk ≥ 0.
3. Set xj = 0 for j > k, and for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, set:
xj =
√
wjyj∑k
i=1
√
wiyi
(X +
k∑
i=1
yi)− yj .
The computational complexity of this algorithm is O(n log n),
dominated by the sorting. In practice, the best response can
be computed infrequently (e.g. once a minute), so for a typ-
ically powerful modern host, this cost is negligible.
The best response algorithm must send and receive O(n)
messages because each user must obtain the total bids from
each host. In practice, this is more significant than the com-
putational cost. Note that hosts only reveal to users the sum
of the bids on them. As a result, hosts do not reveal the pri-
vate preferences and even the individual bids of one user to
another.
4.2 Finite Parallelism Model
Recall that in the finite parallelism model, each user i only
places bids on at most ki machines. Of course, the infinite
parallelism model is just a special case of finite parallelism
model in which ki = n for all the i’s. In the finite parallelism
model, computing the social optimum is no longer trivial
due to bounded parallelism. It can instead be computed by
using the maximum matching algorithm.
Consider the weighted complete bipartite graphG = (U, V, U×
V ), where U = {uiℓ|1 ≤ i ≤ m, and 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ ki}, V =
{1, 2, . . . , n} with edge weight wij assigned to the edge (uiℓ, vj).
A matching of G is a set of edges with disjoint nodes, and
the weight of a matching is the total weights of the edges in
the matching. As a result, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 1. The social optimum is the same as the maxi-
mum weight matching of G.
Thus, we can use the maximum weight matching algorithm
to compute the social optimum. The maximum weight match-
ing is a classical network problem and can be solved in poly-
nomial time [13, 7, 8]. We choose to implement the Hungar-
ian algorithm [13, 18] because of its simplicity. There may
exist more efficient algorithm for computing the maximum
matching by exploiting the special structure of G. This re-
mains an interesting open question.
However, we do not know an efficient algorithm to compute
the best response under the finite parallelism model. In-
stead, we provide the following local search heuristic.
Suppose we again have n machines with weights w1, . . . , wn
and total bids y1, . . . , yn. Let the user’s budget be X and
the parallelism bound be k. Our goal is to compute an
allocation of X to up to k machines to maximize the user’s
utility.
For a subset of machines A, denote by x(A) the best re-
sponse on A without parallelism bound and by U(A) the
utility obtained by the best response algorithm. The local
search works as follows:
1. Set A to be the k machines with the highest wi/yi.
2. Compute U(A) by the best response algorithm on A.
3. For each i ∈ A and each j /∈ A, repeat
4. Let B = A− {i}+ {j}, compute U(B).
5. If(U(B) > U(A)), let A← B, and goto 2.
6. Output x(A).
Intuitively, by the local search heuristic, we test if we can
swap a machine in A for one not in A to improve the best re-
sponse utility. If yes, we swap the machines and repeat the
process. Otherwise, we have reached a local maxima and
output that value. We suspect that the local maxima that
this algorithm finds is also the global maximum (with re-
spect to an individual user) and that this process stop after
a few number of iterations, but we have not proven it. How-
ever, in our simulations, this algorithm quickly converges to
a high (≥ .7) efficiency.
4.3 Local Greedy Adjustment
The above best response algorithms only work for the linear
utility functions described earlier. In practice, utility func-
tions may have more a complicated form, or even worse,
a user may not have a formulation of his utility function.
We do assume that the user still has a way to measure his
utility, which is the minimum assumption necessary for any
market-based resource allocation mechanism. In these sit-
uations, users can use a more general strategy, the local
greedy adjustment method, which works as follows. A user
finds the two machines that provide him with the highest
and lowest marginal utility. He then moves a fixed small
amount of money from the machine with low marginal util-
ity to the machine with the higher one. This strategy aims
to adjust the bids so that the marginal values at each ma-
chine being bid on are the same. This condition guarantees
the allocation is the optimum when the utility function is
concave. The tradeoff for local greedy adjustment is that it
takes longer to stabilize than best-response.
5. SIMULATION RESULTS
While the analytic results provide us with worst-case analy-
sis for the infinite parallelism model, in this section we em-
ploy simulations to study the properties of the Nash equilib-
ria in more realistic scenarios and for the finite parallelism
model. First, we determine whether the user bidding process
converges, and if so, what the rate of convergence is. Sec-
ond, in cases of convergence, we look at the performance at
equilibrium, using the efficiency and fairness metrics defined
above.
Iterative Method. In our simulations, each user starts
with an initial bid vector and then iteratively updates his
bids until a convergence criterion (described below) is met.
The initial bid is set proportional to the user’s weights on
the machines. We experiment with two update methods, the
best response methods, as described in Section 4.1 and 4.2,
and the local greedy adjustment method, as described in
Section 4.3.
Convergence Criteria. Convergence time measures how
quickly the system reaches equilibrium. Convergence time is
particularly important in the context of distributed shared
clusters due to their dynamics. For example, tasks start and
finish and users change their minds about the importance
of running tasks. A resource allocation scheme may result
in high efficiency at equilibrium, but the system may always
change before it can reach equilibrium. For example, of the
two resource allocation schemes depicted in Figure 2, if we
expect the dynamics of the system to change at a rate of
approximately t1, we may prefer resource allocation scheme
(a) over (b) even though the efficiency at NEb is higher.
Figure 2: Resource allocation scheme (a) converges
more slowly than (b) but achieves an equilibrium with
higher efficiency. NEa and NEb are the Nash equilibria
for (a) and (b), respectively.
There are several different criteria for convergence. The
strongest criterion is to require that there is only negligi-
ble change in the bids of each user. The problem with this
criterion is that it is too strict: users may see negligible
change in their utilities, but according to this definition the
system has not converged. The less strict utility gap crite-
rion requires there to be only negligible change in the users’
utility. Given users’ concern for utility, this is a more natural
definition. Indeed, in practice, the user is probably not will-
ing to re-allocate their bids dramatically for a small utility
gain. Therefore, we use the utility gap criterion to measure
convergence time for the best response update method, i.e.
we consider that the system has converged if the utility gap
of each user is smaller than ǫ (0.001 in our experiments).
However, this criterion does not work for the local greedy
adjustment method because users of that method will expe-
rience constant fluctuations in utility as they move money
around. For this method, we use the marginal utility gap
criterion. We compare the highest and lowest utility mar-
gins on the machines. If the difference is negligible, then we
consider the system to be converged.
In addition to convergence to the equilibrium, we also con-
sider the criterion from the system provider’s view, the social
welfare stabilization criterion. Under this criterion, a system
has stabilized if the change in social welfare is ≤ ǫ. Individ-
ual users’ utility may not have converged. This criterion is
useful to evaluate how quickly the system as a whole reaches
a particular efficiency level.
User preferences. We experiment with two models of
user preferences, random distribution and correlated distri-
bution. With random distribution, users’ weights on the
different machines are independently and identically dis-
tributed, according the uniform distribution. In practice,
users’ preferences are probably correlated based on factors
like the hosts’ location and the types of applications that
users run. To capture these correlations, we associate with
each user and machine a resource profile vector where each
dimension of the vector represents one resource (e.g., CPU,
memory, and network bandwidth). For a user i with a pro-
file pi = (pi1, . . . , piℓ), pik represents user i’s need for re-
source k. For machine j with profile qj = (qj1, . . . , qjℓ),
qjk represents machine j’s strength with respect to resource
k. Then, wij is the dot product of user i’s and machine
j’s resource profiles, i.e. wij = pi · qj =
∑ℓ
k=1 pikqjk. By
using these profiles, we compress the parameter space and
introduce correlations between users and machines.
In the following simulations, we fix the number of machines
to 100 and vary the number of users from 5 to 250 (but
we only report the results for the range of 5 − 150 users
since the results remain similar for a larger number of users).
Sections 5.1 and 5.2 present the simulation results when we
apply the infinite parallelism and finite parallelism models,
respectively. If the system converges, we report the number
of iterations until convergence. A convergence time of 200
iterations indicates non-convergence, in which case we report
the efficiency and fairness values at the point we terminate
the simulation.
5.1 Infinite parallelism
In this section, we apply the infinite parallelism model, which
assumes that users can use an unlimited number of ma-
chines. We present the efficiency and fairness at the equi-
librium, compared to two baseline allocation methods: so-
cial optimum and weight-proportional, in which users dis-
tribute their bids proportionally to their weights on the ma-
chines (which may seem a reasonable distribution method
intuitively).
We present results for the two user preference models. With
uniform preferences, users’ weights for the different machines
are independently and identically distributed according to
the uniform distribution, U ∼ (0, 1) (and are normalized
thereafter). In correlated preferences, each user’s and each
machine’s resource profile vector has three dimensions, and
their values are also taken from the uniform distribution,
U ∼ (0, 1).
Convergence Time. Figure 3 shows the convergence time,
efficiency and fairness of the infinite parallelism model under
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Figure 4: Efficiency level over time under the infinite
parallelism model. number of users = 40. n = 100.
uniform (left) and correlated (right) preferences. Plots (a)
and (b) show the convergence and stabilization time of the
best-response and local greedy adjustment methods. The
best-response algorithm converges within a few number of
iterations for any number of users. In contrast, the local
greedy adjustment algorithm does not converge even within
500 iterations when the number of users is smaller than 60,
but does converge for a larger number of users. We believe
that for small numbers of users, there are dependency cycles
among the users that prevent the system from converging
because one user’s decisions affects another user, whose de-
cisions affect another user, etc. Regardless, the local greedy
adjustment method stabilizes within 100 iterations.
Figure 4 presents the efficiency over time for a system with
40 users. It demonstrates that while both adjustment meth-
ods reach the same social welfare, the best-response algo-
rithm is faster.
In the remainder of this paper, we will refer to the (Nash)
equilibrium, independent of the adjustment method used to
reach it.
Efficiency. Figure 3 (c) and (d) present the efficiency as
a function of the number of users. We present the efficiency
at equilibrium, and use the social optimum and the weight-
proportional static allocation methods for comparison. So-
cial optimum provides an efficient allocation by definition.
For both user preference models, the efficiency at the equi-
librium is approximately 0.9, independent of the number of
users, which is only slightly worse than the social optimum.
The efficiency at the equilibrium is ≈ 50% improvement over
the weight-proportional allocation method for uniform pref-
erences, and ≈ 30% improvement for correlated preferences.
Fairness. Figure 3(e) and (f) present the utility uniformity
as a function of the number of users, and figures (g) and
(h) present the envy-freeness. While the social optimum
yields perfect efficiency, it has poor fairness. The weight-
proportional method achieves the highest fairness among the
three allocation methods, but the fairness at the equilibrium
is close.
The utility uniformity is slightly better at the equilibrium
under uniform preferences (> 0.7) than under correlated
preferences (> 0.6), since when users’ preferences are more
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Figure 3: Efficiency, utility uniformity, enviness and convergence time as a function of the number of users under the
infinite parallelism model, with uniform and correlated preferences. n = 100.
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Figure 5: Convergence time under the finite parallelism
model. n = 100.
aligned, users’ happiness is more likely going to be at the
expense of each other. Although utility uniformity decreases
in the number of users, it remains reasonable even for a large
number of users, and flattens out at some point. At the
social optimum, utility uniformity can be infinitely poor, as
some users may be allocated no resources at all. The same is
true with respect to envy-freeness. The difference between
uniform and correlated preferences is best demonstrated in
the social optimum results. When the number of users is
small, it may be possible to satisfy all users to some extent
if their preferences are not aligned, but if they are aligned,
even with a very small number of users, some users get no
resources, thus both utility uniformity and envy-freeness go
to zero. As the number of users increases, it becomes almost
impossible to satisfy all users independent of the existence
of correlation.
These results demonstrate the tradeoff between the differ-
ent allocation methods. The efficiency at the equilibrium is
lower than the social optimum, but it performs much bet-
ter with respect to fairness. The equilibrium allocation is
completely envy-free under uniform preferences and almost
envy-free under correlated preferences.
5.2 Finite parallelism
We also consider the finite parallelism model and use the
local search algorithm, as described in Section 4.2, to ad-
just user’s bids. We again experimented with both the uni-
form and correlated preferences distributions and did not
find significant differences in the results so we present the
simulation results for only the uniform distribution.
In our experiments, the local search algorithm stops quickly
— it usually only requires two iterations before it discovers
a local maximum. As we mentioned before, we cannot prove
that a local maximum is the global maximum, but our ex-
periments indicate that the local search heuristic leads to
high efficiency.
Convergence time. Let ∆ denote the parallelism bound
that limits the maximum number of machines each user can
bid on. We experiment with ∆ = 5 and ∆ = 20. In both
cases, we use 100 machines and vary the number of users.
Figure 5 presents the convergence time for these scenarios.
It shows that the system does not always converge, but if it
does, the convergence happens quickly. For ∆ = 5, the non-
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Figure 6: Efficiency level over time under the finite par-
allelism model with local search algorithm. n = 100.
convergence occurs when the number of users is between 20
and 40; and for ∆ = 20, it is when the number of users is
between 5 and 10. In both cases, the ratio of “competitors”
per machine, δ = m × ∆/n for m users and n machines,
is in the interval [1, 2]. We believe that when this ratio is
small, there is no competition in the system so the equi-
librium can be quickly reached. On the other hand, when
competition is high, each machine has bids from many users,
so each user’s decision has a small impact on other users, so
the system is more stable and can gradually reach conver-
gence. However, when there is “head-to-head” competition
on each machine, one user’s decisions may cause dramatic
changes in another’s decisions and cause large fluctuations
in bids. What is interesting, however, is that although the
system does not converge in these “bad” ranges, the system
nontheless achieves and maintains a high level of overall ef-
ficiency after a few iterations (as shown in Figure 6).
Performance. In Figure 7, we present the efficiency, util-
ity uniformity, and envy-freeness at the Nash equilibrium
for the finite parallelism model. When the system does not
converge, we measure performance by taking the minimum
value we observe after running for many iterations. When
∆ = 5, there is a performance drop, in particular with re-
spect to the fairness metrics, in the range between 20 and
40 users (where it does not converge). For a larger number
of users, the system converges and achieves a lower level
of utility uniformity, but a high degree of efficiency and
envy-freeness, similar to those under the infinite parallelism
model. As described above, this is due the competition ratio
falling into the “head-to-head” range. When the parallelism
bound is large (∆ = 20), the performance is closer to the
infinite parallelism model, and we do not observe this drop
in performance.
6. RELATED WORK
In this section, we describe related work in resource alloca-
tion. There are two main groups: those that incorporate an
economic mechanism, and those that do not.
One class of non-economic algorithms examine resource allo-
cation from a scheduling perspective (surveyed by Pindedo
[19]). One solution is to schedule using FCFS. This al-
lows an efficient implementation, but does not account for
the differing values of tasks. More sophisticated solutions
use combinatorial optimization (described by Papadimitriou
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  20  40  60  80  100  120  140  160
Number of Users
(a) Limit: 5 machines/user
Efficiency
Utility uniformity
Envy-freeness
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90
Number of Users
(b) Limit: 20 machines/user
Efficiency
Utility uniformity
Envy-freeness
Figure 7: Efficiency, utility uniformity and envy-freeness under the finite parallelism model. n = 100.
and Steiglitz [18]), or examine the resource consumption of
tasks (a recent example is work by Wierman and Harchol-
Balter [28]). However, these assume that the values and re-
source consumption of tasks are reported accurately, which
does not apply in the presence of strategic users. We view
scheduling and resource allocation as two separate functions.
Resource allocation divides a resource among different users
while scheduling takes a given allocation and orders a user’s
jobs.
Examples of the economic approach are Spawn (by Wald-
spurger, et al. [26]), work by Stoica, et al. [24]., the Mil-
lennium resource allocator (by Chun, et al. [4]), work by
Wellman, et al. [27], Bellagio (by AuYoung, et al. [2]),
and Tycoon (by Lai, et al. [14]). Spawn and the work by
Wellman, et al. uses a reservation abstraction similar to
the way airline seats are allocated. Unfortunately, reserva-
tions have a high latency to acquire resources, unlike the
price-anticipating scheme we consider. Bellagio uses a cen-
tralized allocator called SHARE developed by Chun, et al.
[3]. SHARE allocates resources using a centralized combina-
torial auction that allows users to express preferences with
complementarities. Solving the NP-complete combinatorial
auction problem provides an optimally efficient allocation.
The price-anticipating scheme that we consider does not ex-
plicitly operate on complementarities, thereby possibly los-
ing some efficiency, but it also avoids the complexity and
overhead of combinatorial auctions.
The proportional share abstraction used in the Millennium
and Tycoon resource allocators are the systems which are
closest to the fixed budget, price-anticipating scheme that
we examine here. However, this work focused on implemen-
tation and system design issues, while this work focuses on
analysis and simulation.
There have been several analyses [11, 12, 9, 23, 10] of varia-
tions of price-anticipating allocation schemes. Whereas pre-
vious work analyzed these schemes in the context of allo-
cating network capacity for flows (with the corresponding
topology constraints), we examine allocating computational
capacity for tasks, in which users have task-dependent pri-
vate preferences for machines. For example, a user of a sci-
entific application would prefer machines with faster CPUs
and more memory. In addition, previous work allowed users
to have unlimited budgets with a utility loss for spent funds,
while we assume a more realistic limited budget. These dif-
ferences make the game we analyze qualitatively different
from those in previous studies. For example, there exist
multiple Nash equilibria in our game, and our game does no
longer falls into the category of congestion games [22, 15] or
potential games [16].
7. CONCLUSIONS
This work studies the performance of a market-based mech-
anism for distributed shared clusters using both analyat-
ical and simulation methods. We show that despite the
worst case bounds, the system can reach a high performance
level at the Nash equilibrium in terms of both efficiency and
fairness metrics. In addition, with a few exceptions under
the finite parallelism model, the system reaches equilibrium
quickly by using the best response algorithm and, when the
number of users is not too small, by the greedy local adjust-
ment method.
While our work indicates that the price-anticipating scheme
may work well for resource allocation for shared clusters,
there are many interesting directions for furture work. One
direction is to consider more realistic utility functions. For
example, we assume that there is no parallelization cost, and
there is no performance degradation when multiple users
share the same machine. In practice, both assumptions may
not be correct. Another assumption is that users have infi-
nite work, so the more resources they can acquire, the better.
In practice, users have finite work. One approach is address
this is to model the user’s utility according to the time to
finish a task rather than the amount of resources he receives.
Another direction is to study the dynamic properties of the
system when the users’ needs change over time, according
to some statistical model. In addition to the usual questions
concerning repeated games, it would also be important to
understand how users should allocate their budgets wisely
over time to accomodate future needs.
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APPENDIX
A. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Recall that wij is the weight of user i on machine j, where
1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ n. We consider strongly competitive
game in which for any 1 ≤ j ≤ n, there exist i1 6= i2, such
that wi1j , wi2j > 0. Suppose that xij is the investment of
player i on machine j. Let Yj =
∑m
i=1 xij , the total amount
invested on machine j, and zij = Yj−xij . LetX =∑mi=1Xi,
the total money in the system, and Zi = X −Xi.
Consider the perturbed game Qε in which each player’s pay-
off function is:
Uεi (x) =
n∑
j=1
wij
xij
ε+ Yj
.
Or we can think that there is an additional player who in-
vests a tiny amount of money on each machine so the func-
tion Uεi is continuous and concave everywhere. It is easily
verified that Uεi is concave in xij ’s, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. The
domain of player i’s strategy is the set
Ωi = {(xi1, . . . , xin) |
n∑
j=1
xij = Xi , xij ≥ 0} ,
which is clearly a compact convex set. Therefore, by Rosen’s
theorem [21], there exists a Nash equilibrium of the game
Qε. Pick ωε = (xεij) be any equilibrium. Let ε→ 0. Again,
since the strategy space is compact, there exist a infinite
sequence that converge to a limit point. Suppose the limit
point is ω, i.e. we have a sequence εk → 0 and ωεk → ω.
Clearly, ω is a legitimate strategy. We shall show that ω is
a Nash equilibrium of the original game Q = Q0. We can
safely assume that for each player i, it has non-zero weights
on at least two machines. The other cases can be easily
handled — if the weights of a player is all 0, we can split
his money evenly on all the machines; if a player has only
one positive weight, it will have to invest all of his money
on that machine. In both cases, they will only increase the
reservation price on some machines and not cause problem
to our argument.
Let us consider only those ε’s in the converging sequence.
In what follows, a constant means a number that is solely
determined by the system parameters, m, n, wij ’s, and Xi’s,
and is independent of ε. Similarly, let Y εj =
∑m
i=1 x
ε
ij , and
zεij = Y
ε
j − xεij .
Lemma 2. There exists a constant M0,M1 > 0 such that
for sufficiently small, M0 ≤ λεi ≤M1 for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Proof. For any player i, it has to invest at least Xi
n
on
some machine with positive weight, suppose it is machine j.
Then,
λεi = wij
ε+ zij
(ε+ zij + xij)2
.
Therefore, λεi is minimized when zij = X − Xi and maxi-
mized when ε+ zij = xij . Thus,
λεi ≥ wij ε+X −Xi(ε+X)2 ,
and
λεi ≤ wij
4xij
≤ nwij
4Xi
.
Set M0 = minwij>0 wij ≥ X−Xi4X2 and M1 = maxwij>0
nwij
4Xi
.
It is easy to verify that when ε ≤ X, M0 ≤ λεi ≤M1.
Lemma 3. There exists a constant c0 > 0 such that for
sufficiently small ε and for any j, Y εj ≥ c0.
Proof. We first show that for sufficiently small ε, in the
Nash equilbrium of Qε, there are at least two players in-
vesting on each machine. For machine j, let wj ,Wj be, re-
spectively, the minimum and maximum nonzero weight on
j. When ε < wj/M1 (defined in Lemma 2), there must be
some player investing on machine j because if otherwise, a
player i’s margin on machine j is wij/ε > M1, whenever
wij > 0. Thus, there must be some player investing on
player j for sufficiently small ε. Now consider the situation
when there is only one player investing on machine j. Sup-
pose it is player i. Then, λi = wij
ε
(ε+xε
ij
)2
. Since λi ≥ M0,
xεij ≤
√
wijε
M0
− ε. For another player k with nonzero weight
on j (we know there must exist one by assumption), its mar-
gin λ on machine j is
wkj
ε+ xεij
≥ wkj
√
M0
wijε
.
Therefore, when ε <
w2jM0
WjM
2
1
, there must be at least two
players investing on j.
Now, suppose that there are k ≥ 2 players investing on
machine j in Qε. Let them be player 1 to k. Clearly, all of
those players have non-zero weights on j. By Lemma 2, we
have that for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k, wij ε+z
ε
ij
(ε+Y ε
j
)2
≤M1.
Set M2 = maxwij>0M1/wij . Then,
ε+ zεij
(ε+ Y εj )
2
≤M1/wij ≤M2 , for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Thus,
kM2 ≥
k∑
i=1
ε+ zεij
(ε+ Y εj )
2
=
kε+
∑k
i=1 z
ε
ij
(ε+ Y εj )
2
=
kε+ (k − 1)Y εj
(ε+ Y εj )
2
>
k − 1
ε+ Y εj
.
Therefore Y εj >
k−1
kM2
− ε for k ≥ 2. Set c0 = 14M2 . When ε
is sufficiently small, say ≤ 1
4M2
, we have that Y εj ≥ c0.
We are now ready for the main lemma,
Lemma 4. For any δ > 0, for sufficiently small ε, we
have that ∣∣∣∣∂Ui(x)∂xij (ω)− ∂U
ε
i (x)
∂xij
(ωε)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ .
Proof.
∂Ui(x)
∂xij
(ω) = wij
zij
Y 2j
,
∂Uεi (x)
∂xij
(ωε) = wij
zεij
(ε+ Y εj )
2
.
The lemma follows immediately by zεij → zij and Y εj → Yj ,
and that Y εj ≥ c0, for some constant c0 > 0.
Now, we are ready to show that ω is a Nash equilibrium
of the game Q. Suppose it is not true, then the optimum
condition is violated for some player i. There are two pos-
sibilities.
1. There are j, k, where j 6= k, such that xij , xik > 0 and
∂Ui
∂xij
6= ∂Ui
∂xik
. By Lemma 4, we know that for sufficiently
small ε, the following holds: xεij > 0, x
ε
ik > 0, and
∂Uεi
∂xij
(ωε) 6= ∂Uεi
∂xik
(ωε). This contradicts with that ωε
is a Nash equilibrium of Qε. Now, we assume that
λi = wij
∂Ui
∂xij
(ω) for any xij > 0. The other case is
then
2. There is j where xij = 0 and wij
∂Ui
∂xij
(ω) > λi. By the
same reason as 1, we can derive contradiction again.
Hence, ω is a Nash equilibrium of the game Q.
B. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Suppose that the weights for the two users are u1, . . . , un and
w1, . . . , wn, respectively. Denote by x1, . . . , xn and y1, . . . , yn
the bids for the two users on the machines. We first show
that worst case can always be achieved by when there are
only two machines and then show that the lower bound holds
for two users and two machines.
We first make several observations.
Lemma 5. If there is an allocation such that ∂U1
∂xi
≥ λ1
and ∂U2
∂yi
≥ µ1, then there exist a Nash equilibrium with mar-
gin λ, µ where λ ≥ λ1 and µ ≥ µ1.
Proof. Follows from that ∂U1
∂xi
≥ λ1 is a convex set. We
can restrict the strategy to the set Ω satisfying
ui
yi
(xi + yi)2
≥ λ1
wi
xi
(xi + yi)2
≥ µ1
n∑
i=1
xi = X
n∑
i=1
yi = Y
xi, yi ≥ 0
Since Ω is convex and non-empty, there exists a Nash equilib-
rium, say ω = (x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn), in the restricted strat-
egy set Ω. We show that it is a Nash equilibrium in the full
strategy space. Otherwise, suppose that x = (x1, . . . , xn)
is not the best response to y = (y1, . . . , yn). Then, there
are i, j such that ui
yi
(xi+yi)
2 6= uj yj(xj+yj)2 . Let ui
yi
(xi+yi)
2 >
uj
yj
(xj+yj)
2 ≥ λ0. We let x∗i = xi + ǫ and x∗j = xj − ǫ. Let
x∗ be the strategy with xi replaced by x∗i and xj by x
∗
j .
For sufficiently small ǫ, we have that U1(x
∗, y) > U2(x, y)
by ui
yi
(xi+yi)
2 > uj
yj
(xj+yj)
2 . Further, x
∗ ∈ Ω, contradicting
with that x is the best response to y in Ω.
Now, we show that if we merge two machines, it will only de-
crease the social welfare at the Nash equilibrium. By merg-
ing two machines, i and j, we mean that we replace the
two machines with a new machine with weights ui+ uj and
wi +wj for the two users, respectively.
Lemma 6. Let Q1 be obtained from Q by merging any two
machines, then we have that U(Q1) ≤ U(Q).
Proof. Let ω = (x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn) be a Nash equi-
librium of Q. Then,
U1(ω) =
n∑
j=1
ui
xi
xi + yi
=
n∑
j=1
ui − ui yi
xi + yi
=
n∑
j=1
ui −
n∑
j=1
λ(xi + yi) = 1− 2λ .
Similarly, U2(ω) = 1− 2µ.
Now, we show a stronger statement that any Nash equilib-
rium ω of Q, there exists a Nash equilibrium ω1 of Q1 such
that
Ui(Q1, ω1) ≤ Ui(Q,ω) , for any 1 ≤ i ≤ 2.
We only need to show that there exists ω1 such that λ1 ≥ λ
and µ1 ≥ µ where λ1, µ1 are the respective margin at ω1 for
the two players. Suppose that Q1 is obtained by replacing
machine n−1 and n of Q by machine (n−1)′. Now consider
the Nash equilibrium ω of Q. Consider the allocation ω0 =
(x1, . . . , xn−2, xn−1+xn, y1, . . . , yn−2, yn−1+yn). Let λ0, µ0
be the respective margin of the players on machine (n− 1)′
at ω0. We now show that λ0 ≥ λ and µ0 ≥ µ. We wish to
show that
(un−1 + un)
yn−1 + yn
(xn−1 + xn + yn−1 + yn)2
≥ un−1 yn−1
(xn−1 + yn−1)2
= un
yn
(xn + yn)2
.
Let an−1 = xn−1+yn−1, an = xn+yn, and c =
un−1
un
. Then
the above is equivalent to show that
yn−1 + yn
(an−1 + an)2
≥ min
(
c
yn−1
a2n−1
, (1− c)yn
a2n
)
.
The right hand side achieves maximum at
yn−1yn
yn−1a2n + yna2n−1
,
when
c =
yn
a2n
/(
yn−1
a2n−1
+
yn
a2n
) .
It is now easy to verify that
yn−1 + yn
(an−1 + an)2
≥ yn−1yn
yn−1a2n + yna2n−1
.
For all the other machines, they still have margin λ and µ.
By Lemma 5, there exists a Nash equilibrium of Q1 with
margin λ1, µ1 with λ1 ≥ λ and µ1 ≥ µ. This proves the
lemma.
By the above lemma, to consider the worst case perfor-
mance, we divide the machines into two sets
L = {i | ui ≥ wi} and R = {i |ui < wi} .
If R = ∅, then ui = wi for all the i’s. In this case, any
allocation achieves total utility 1. So we assume that R 6= ∅.
We create a new game Q2 in which there are only two ma-
chines A and B where
uA =
∑
i∈L ui wA =
∑
i∈L wi
uB =
∑
i∈R ui wB =
∑
i∈R wi
By Lemma 6, U(Q2) ≤ U(Q). Clearly, U∗(Q2) = U∗(Q)
because we allow the player 1 to occupy wholly the machine
A and player 2 to occupy B, which results a total utility
uA + wB =
∑n
i=1max(ui, wi). Now, our task is relatively
easier, we need to find out the worst performance when there
are only two machines.
Suppose that the two users’ weights are, respectively, (α, 1−
α), (β, 1 − β) with 0 < α, β < 1. And their allocation is
(x, 1 − x) and (y, 1 − y). Let s = x + y and τ = (2− s)/s.
We have the following equalities.
s = 2/(1 + τ ) (2)
U = 2− 2(λ+ µ) (3)
λ+ µ =
αβ
s
+
(1− α)(1− β)
2− s (4)
Equality (2) is obvious. Equality (3) is proved in the proof
of Lemma 6. Equality (4) is the consequence of the following
equations:
λ
α
+
µ
β
=
1
s
(5)
λ
1− α +
µ
1− β =
1
2− s (6)
Equation (5) is due to α y
s2
= λ, β x
s2
= µ, and s = x + y.
Clearly, (4) follows if we multiply (5) by αβ and (6) by
(1− α)(1− β) and then add them.
Now, we define some notations for later use.
b =
1
4αβ
+
1
4β
+
7
4α
− 2
c =
1
2α
+
1
2β
− 1
d =
(1− α)(1− β)
αβ
e = b− c = 5
4α
+
1
4αβ
− 1
4β
− 1
Since 0 < α, β < 1, it is easy to verify that b, c, d, e > 0.
From
α
y
s2
= (1− α) 1− y
(2− s)2 ,
β
x
s2
= (1− β) 1− x
(2− s)2 ,
we have that
ατ 2y = (1− α)(1− y) ,
βτ 2x = (1− β)(1− x) .
That is, x = 1
1+τ2(1−β)/β and y =
1
1+τ2(1−α)/α . Further,
x+ y = s = 2
1+τ
. Therefore,
1
1 + τ 2(1− β)/β +
1
1 + τ 2(1− α)/α =
2
1 + τ
.
Simplifying the above equation, we obtain that
τ 3 − cτ 2 + cτ − d = 0 . (7)
Without loss of generality, we assume that α ≥ β, 1−β, 1−α.
Thus, U∗ = α+1−β. Combining Equalities (2,3,4), we have
that
U = 2− 2(λ+ µ)
= 2− 2
(
αβ
s
+
(1− α)(1− β)
2− s
)
= U∗ − (αβτ + (1− α)(1− β)
τ
+ 2αβ − 2β) .
Now, we assume that U/U∗ < 3/4 and derive contradiction.
If U/U∗ < 3/4, then
αβτ +
(1− α)(1− β)
τ
+ 2αβ − 2β > (1 + α− β)/4 . (8)
The above inequality is equivalent to that Fα,β(τ ) > 0,
where
Fα,β(τ ) = τ
2 − bτ + d .
We now just need to show that for any 0 < β ≤ α < 1, there
does not exist positive root for (7) which satisfies Fα,β(τ ) >
0. The proof is by algebraic arguments, and the details are
omitted.
